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Abstract—Progress toward universal health coverage (UHC)
requires making difficult trade-offs. In this journal, Dr. Margaret
Chan, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General, has
endorsed the principles for making such decisions put forward by the
WHO Consultative Group on Equity and UHC. These principles
include maximizing population health, priority for the worse off, and
shielding people from health-related financial risks. But how should
one apply these principles in particular cases, and how should one
adjudicate between them when their demands conflict? This article
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by some members of the Consultative Group and a diverse group of
health policy professionals addresses these questions. It considers
three stylized versions of actual policy dilemmas. Each of these
cases pertains to one of the three key dimensions of progress toward
UHC: which services to cover first, which populations to prioritize
for coverage, and how to move from out-of-pocket expenditures to
prepayment with pooling of funds. Our cases are simplified to
highlight common trade-offs. Though we make specific
recommendations, our primary aim is to demonstrate both the form
and substance of the reasoning involved in striking a fair balance
between competing interests on the road to UHC.
INTRODUCTION
Universal health coverage (UHC) requires that all people
have genuine access, at tolerable cost, to a comprehensive
range of high-quality services that is well aligned with other
social goals.1 There are many reasons to make progress
toward UHC, including bettering people’s health, ensuring
equitable access to health services, reducing inequalities in
health, and reducing the shocks to income and wealth caused
by ill health.
It is useful to conceive of progress toward UHC as occur-
ring along at least three dimensions: expanding the range of
covered high-quality services, increasing the share of people
covered, and reducing out-of-pocket payments.2 In advanc-
ing along these axes, governments confront the following
questions:
1. For which services should one expand coverage first?
2. For whom should one expand coverage first?
3. How should one shift from out-of-pocket payment
toward prepayment and pooling of funds?
Because of resource and institutional constraints, in
answering these questions, governments often confront chal-
lenging trade-offs. Here, we focus on the deliberation
involved in making these trade-offs in a fair or distributively
just way. Our question is about what distributive justice per-
mits a decision maker to choose from a specified feasible set
of alternatives.[a] We are therefore not attempting to answer
questions of politics or political economy. The latter rather
form the background for our enquiry because they determine
the content of the decision maker’s feasible set. Our enquiry
is, however, relevant for politics and the behavior of interest
groups, because the opinions and actions of politicians, the
public, and interest groups are often at least somewhat
responsive to considerations of distributive justice. An evalu-
ation of alternatives in terms of justice is therefore important
not merely because it helps identify a fair alternative. It is
also important because this evaluation, if publicly discussed,
may determine the degree of support for the proposed policy.
The World Health Organization (WHO) Consultative
Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage was con-
vened to formulate guidance on how to conduct such deliber-
ation. The Group issued its report, Making Fair Choices on
the Path to Universal Health Coverage, in 2014.1
The Group conducted an extensive review of the literature
on the values underlying UHC, paying special attention to
WHO publications. As a result of this review and extended
discussion among its diverse membership, Making Fair
Choices argues that the following three principles should
play a central role in evaluating policies:
1. Health benefit maximization. This involves generating
the greatest total health-related well-being gain. Here,
we express this gain in terms of an amount of health-
related well-being equivalent to one year in full health.
For example, a person gains the equivalent of one year
in full health by living three additional years with
health problems that leave them with just one third
of the health-related quality of life that they would
have had in full health. Various measures of health-
related well-being exist, including Quality-Adjusted
Life Years (QALYs) and Disability-Adjusted Life
Years (DALYs).3 For a given budget, one maximizes
total health gain by choosing the interventions that cost
the least for each such equivalent of a year in full health
generated. These are referred to as the most cost-effec-
tive interventions.[b]
2. Fair distribution, which incorporates priority for the
worse off. Coverage for and usage of health services
should be determined by need. Special consideration
should be given to the needs of those who are worse off
with respect to health prospects and outcomes, access
to health services, income and wealth, or social status.
3. Fair contribution and financial risk protection. Pay-
ments toward necessary coverage and services should
align with ability to pay and should be independent of
individuals’ health risk profiles. Moreover, economic
hardship due to health care costs and illness-related
loss of income should be minimized.
Making Fair Choices holds that these three principles
apply universally—that is, that they are relevant to determin-
ing the fair decision in all contexts. But it also holds that the
weight given to each principle may reasonably vary from
society to society and that particular contexts will make rele-
vant further values and principles. Naturally, the process of
applying these principles and balancing their demands is not
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mechanical; it requires debate and the exercise of judgment.
Making Fair Choices emphasizes that citizens are entitled to
play a part in this process. It also stresses that inclusive and
transparent deliberation contribute to the legitimacy of public
decisions. It therefore recommends that mechanisms for pub-
lic accountability are set up to enable citizens to evaluate and
contribute to health policy decisions.
These principles and recommendations were endorsed by
Dr. Margaret Chan, Director-General of theWHO, in a contri-
bution to this journal.4 In this article, we aim to advance
understanding of the process of using the three substantive
principles to make decisions. We add to the discussion of this
process in Making Fair Choices by starting from stylized but
realistic scenarios that were not analyzed in the report and by
offering a more in-depth discussion of the relevant values and
the trade-offs between them. To develop these scenarios, 20
contributors to a multiday “writeshop” were divided into
teams with different expertise and diverse nationalities. Draw-
ing on their experience, each team formulated several real-
world cases involving a choice from a limited feasible set
(usually of two policies) that raised challenging questions of
justice. The choices in these cases were ones that governments
they work for or work with had faced. These cases were pre-
sented to other teams. The ones that the group as a whole
judged to be most useful were retained and given to a new
group to refine; they were then presented to the whole group
anew. In this process, the cases were simplified and general-
ized to each highlight one particular trade-off and discuss it in
a manner that is accessible to professionals and students.
Here, we present three of these cases, each of which con-
cerns trade-offs within the aforementioned three dimensions
along which progress should be made, namely, which interven-
tions to invest in first (case 1), which populations to prioritize
for an expansion of coverage (case 2), and how to move from
out-of-pocket expenditures to prepayment (case 3). They com-
plement other recently published case studies that deal with
trade-offs between these dimensions (e.g., whether to provide
more services to people who already have access to a basic
package or to grant access to the basic package to more people)
and with the institutional mechanisms for setting priorities.5
Although we offer a verdict in each case, other judgments
may be reasonable.Moreover, the correct judgment in any partly
similar real-world case will depend on context-specific factors,
including both a case-specific assessment of the likely impact of
the options as well as further pertinent considerations of justice.
These studies are therefore intended not as policy recommenda-
tions for analogous real-world circumstances but rather as dis-
cussion pieces, which demonstrate the forms of deliberation
required to arrive at just case judgments.
CASE 1. WHICH SERVICES SHOULD ONE EXPAND
FIRST: DIALYSIS OR PREVENTION?
A middle-income country operates a predominantly govern-
ment-financed UHC scheme for the informal sector, which
makes up 70% of the population. At the moment of decision,
this scheme covers neither dialysis for end-stage renal failure
nor preventative services for people who have diabetes mellitus.
Income per person is increasing and so this scheme’s package of
covered services can be expanded. Within their budget con-
straint, the health authorities can do one of the following[c]:
1. Add coverage for dialysis. Due to limits on the budget
and provider capacity, only the more cost-effective
peritoneal dialysis will be covered, and there will be
some copayments.
2. Add coverage for preventative services for people with
diabetes mellitus.
Table 1 summarizes the data available to inform this
choice. (We comment on each indicator below.) This infor-
mation permits the following analysis.
Health Benefit Maximization
As ameasure of cost-effectiveness in relation to the resources the
country has available, Table 1 reports an estimate of the multi-
ples of the country’s income per person—gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita—that an intervention requires to generate
one equivalent of a year in full health. The lower this number,
themore cost-effective an intervention is.
Table 1 reveals that preventative services under consider-
ation are estimated to be far more cost-effective than dialy-
sis—they yield between 2.9 and 59 times more total health
benefit per unit of expenditure. Devoting a given amount of
resources to these preventative services would therefore gen-
erate a far greater total gain in health-related quality of life.
Priority for the Worse Off
In determining who is worse off, there is reasonable disagree-
ment on whether only individuals’ health expectations matter
or only their health outcomes or, indeed, that both matter.6,7
We shall here consider both.
In terms of prospects, the health risks of the people in
need of secondary preventative services, though substantial,
are lower than those in need of dialysis, most of whom face
certain early death without treatment.
In terms of outcomes, one way of determining who would
be worse off if unaided is by considering who would bear the
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largest individual burden of disease in the absence of inter-
vention. Table 1 lists an indicator of this burden: the average
number of healthy life year equivalents lost due to the condi-
tion by patients in whom it would be fatal if untreated. Both
interventions alleviate very substantial individual disease
burdens. Nonetheless, those with end-stage renal disease
who die of the condition if untreated lose on average 11
more years of life than those who present with diabetes and
die due to a lack of preventative services. This indicates that
the population with end-stage renal disease is, on average,
worse off in terms of lifetime health outcomes than those in
the target population for preventative services.
In sum, dialysis patients generally face both worse health
prospects and worse health outcomes. This is a reason for giv-
ing some extra weight to health improvements due to dialysis.
Financial Risk Protection
A large share of individuals with end-stage renal disease and
their families will purchase dialysis privately at great expense
if it is not covered, often selling off family assets or going into
debt to do so.8 Adding coverage for dialysis will therefore pre-
vent many cases of catastrophic health expenditure. (There is
no universally accepted definition of catastrophic expendi-
ture. We therefore report estimates for two thresholds that are
sometimes used: expenditure exceeding 10% and 20% of total
household income.) However, precisely because dialysis is so
costly, it takes a large amount of resources to prevent one
such case. Indeed, as reported in Table 1, it is estimated that,
if we use the higher of our two thresholds, the government
would have to spend 5.2 times GDP per capita on coverage
for dialysis to prevent one such case for a year.
By contrast, the financial risk protection of adding cover-
age for preventative services is less obvious. After all, one
might reason that the yearly cost of these services is lower
and therefore less likely to push people into financial hard-
ship. However, this reasoning ignores that coverage for, and
the subsequent expansion of the use of, preventative services
will avert many complications from diabetes, including loss
of sight, renal disease, heart disease and stroke. Such compli-
cations cause high costs, even for people with health insur-
ance. These costs include copayments for medicines and
care, as well as costs of travel to and from clinics. They also
include the cost of informal care by relatives.9,10 Indeed,
research indicates that in countries like the one under consid-
eration, around one fifth of people with complications from
diabetes face catastrophic health expenditure. (Calculations
based on Chatterjee et al.9; details are in Appendix 1 in sup-
plemental material.) Because preventative services generate
far greater health gains per unit of expenditure than dialysis,
it is possible that, by averting cases of complications and
associated health spending, these services offer a more effi-
cient way of generating financial risk protection. Indeed, the
tentative estimate reported in Table 1 is that the government
would have to spend 4.2 times GDP per capita on coverage
for preventative services to avoid one case of catastrophic
expenditure (assessed at the >20% of household expenditure
threshold) for a year, which is less than what is required to
avoid a case of catastrophic expenditure through coverage
for dialysis. Naturally, this measure is only one indicator of
Health Benefit Maximization
(Multiples of GDP per capita
per equivalent of a year in full
health gained)
Priority for the Worse Off (Average life
years lost relative to maximum global life
expectancy by patients for whom the
condition would be fatal without
intervention)
Financial Risk Protection (Multiples of
GDP per capita to save one household
from catastrophic health expenditure for a
year, defined as >10% and >20% of
household expenditure)
Dialysis 5.4 35 4.7 (>10%)
5.2 (>20%)
Preventative
services for those
with diabetes
Between 0.09 and 1.9 24 2.1 (>10%)
4.2 (>20%)
aEstimates of GDP per capita per equivalent of a year in full health are based on Teerawattananon et al.29 for dialysis and Venkat Narayan et al.30 for preventative services. Estimates
for life years lost due to each condition are based on the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation.31 Estimates of GDP per capita per household saved from catastrophic expen-
diture for a year through dialysis are derived using Teerawattananon et al.29 and Prakongsai et al.8 For preventative services, our estimates were derived as follows. Research sug-
gests that it is primarily those with complications from diabetes who suffer large health-related expenditures.9,10 We therefore focused exclusively on the impact of preventing
such complications and their associated expenditure. We first estimated how much it would cost in terms of GDP per capita to avoid one case of diabetes-related complications
for a year, using data from Venkat Narayan et al.,30 Wattana et al.,32 and the World Health Organization.33 We then estimated how many cases of complications one would have
to prevent in order to prevent one case of complications-related catastrophic expenditure, using Chatterjee et al.9 Putting these together yields the reported estimate of the GDP
per capita required to prevent one case of catastrophic expenditure via preventing complications from diabetes. (Because of the multiple steps involved in this estimate, we regard
it as uncertain.) Full calculations by the authors are available in Appendix 1 (in supplemental material).
TABLE 1. Available Data for Comparing Dialysis and Preventative Services
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financial risk protection. Because it counts only how many
people exceed a threshold level of expenditure, it is insensi-
tive to how much this threshold is exceeded. Given the high
cost of dialysis, it is possible that the cases of catastrophic
expenditure averted by coverage for dialysis would be more
severe than the cases averted by coverage for preventative
measures. The safest conclusion is therefore that neither
intervention has a clear advantage in terms of financial risk
protection.
We also note that providing coverage for dialysis may
more quickly begin to reduce the number of cases of cata-
strophic expenditure, because it will help families who are
spending money on dialysis now (as well as those who, in
the future, will develop the need for it). In contrast, coverage
for preventative services avoids only future cases of cata-
strophic expenditure by stopping complications. This raises
the question of whether cases of catastrophic expenditure
prevented in a few years’ time matter less than cases pre-
vented in the more immediate future—that is, whether one
should apply what is known as a “discount rate” in assessing
the impact of these two policies. In answering this question,
one should draw a distinction between purely monetary costs
and more fundamental ways in which people’s lives are
affected. It is sensible to discount a given sum of future mon-
etary costs by a relevant market rate of interest, because
money can now be invested at that rate. However, this reason
for discounting money does not apply to fundamental harms
such as a family’s destitution; after all, the magnitude of
harm will, on average, be the same whether it occurs in, say,
one year’s time to one family or in two years’ time to a dif-
ferent family.11 Indeed, we believe that it is reasonable not to
apply a discount rate at all to cases of destitution prevented,
because the harms averted are just as bad, morally speaking,
whenever they would have occurred. But even if one were to
apply a discount rate to cases of catastrophic expenditure pre-
vented, this reasoning demonstrates that this rate ought to be
substantially lower than the discount rate for purely monetary
quantities. In other words: it should matter little, if at all, that
preventative services avert destitution at a later time than
dialysis. The difference in timing of the cases of catastrophic
health-related costs averted should therefore not change our
conclusion that the two policies are more or less on a par
with respect to financial risk protection.
Other Considerations
Many of those who would benefit from coverage for dialysis
are identifiable. By contrast, though the people whose risks
are lowered by the provision of preventative services are
known, those among them whose lives would be extended by
these services are not easily identifiable. There is reasonable
disagreement about whether this difference in identifiability
matters from the point of view of distributive justice.12 One
may therefore reasonably give the needs of identified benefi-
ciaries some (limited) additional weight. This implies that
when two options are very similar with respect to all consid-
erations except for the fact that one saves identified people
and another unidentified people from harm, it is reasonable
(though not morally required) to decide in favor of the for-
mer. But it also implies that when there are substantial differ-
ences between the two policies (e.g., the total harm prevented
to the unidentified people is much larger), then it is wrong to
choose the policy that saves the identified people.
Recommendation
Various ways of weighing these considerations are reason-
able. We offer the following as one way to arbitrate between
cost-effectiveness and other criteria.1 First, create a partial
classification of services into high-, medium-, and low-prior-
ity categories on the basis of cost in relation to GDP per cap-
ita per healthy life year gained and then complete this
classification on the basis of priority for the worse off, finan-
cial risk protection, and other criteria. This procedure is indi-
cated in Figure 1. The horizontal arrows indicate which
priority class the services can be associated with: green indi-
cates high priority, yellow medium priority, and red low pri-
ority. When an intervention’s cost-effectiveness falls in a
range with only one color, then it is incontrovertibly assigned
to the linked category. A service located in an overlapping
interval is not categorized on the basis of cost-effectiveness
alone; instead, the classification also uses information on
people’s disadvantage, their financial risks, and other rele-
vant considerations, such as, in this case, the identifiability of
the beneficiaries of dialysis. (The cutoffs between categories
in Figure 1 are illustrative only. They need to be determined
in a country-specific way with attention to the activities for
which the expenditure in question could be used instead.13,14)
One reason for using such a procedure is the very large
differences in the cost-effectiveness of possible interven-
tions. The proposed process directs resources to where they
FIGURE 1. Classifying Services
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will be especially good at producing more health-related
quality of life. Moreover, an expansion of especially cost-
effective services will often offer relatively large benefits to
the poor, because they are least likely to have access to these
services. Nonetheless, the proposed procedure does not pur-
sue only maximal cost-effectiveness. Indeed, across a sub-
stantial range, it permits concern for the worse off, for
financial risk protection, and for other relevant values to
determine into which priority class a service should fall. It
also gives these considerations a role in choosing between
services that fall within the same priority class.
In our case, this procedure yields the verdict that one
should add coverage for preventative services first. As is visi-
ble in Figure 1, the estimated cost-effectiveness of these serv-
ices places them in the high-priority category or in an
overlapping high-/medium-priority range. By contrast, the
cost-effectiveness of dialysis places it in the low-priority cate-
gory. This procedure therefore generates the judgment that the
more concentrated risks and somewhat greater average indi-
vidual disease burden faced by those who have renal failure,
as well as their identifiability, are not sufficient to outweigh
the far greater total health gains from preventative services.
(In terms of financial risk protection, neither intervention is
clearly superior. Financial risk protection therefore also does
not provide any reason to override the strong case for preven-
tative services on the basis of health maximization.)
Though we believe that the reasons for prioritizing preventa-
tive services in this case are compelling, this decision may prove
controversial. The same compassion for clearly identified, urgent
cases that drives families to fund relatives’ life-saving dialysis
may also prompt the public to demand government funding for
it. In this case, therefore, public consultation and accountability
for the decision is important not merely because of people’s right
to an explanation of how limited resources are spent but also
because careful communication of the reasons for prioritizing
preventative measures is likely to be essential for persuading the
public that this choice is justified.
CASE 2. FORWHOM SHOULD ONE EXPAND
COVERAGE FIRST: THE FORMAL SECTOR OR
THE POOR?
A low-income country is committed to achieving UHC in the
long term. The health system is financed through a combina-
tion of the government health budget, private health insur-
ance, and out-of-pocket payments. The population includes
the following segments.15
The formal sector (10% of the population) consists of sal-
aried workers and their families. They are generally toward
the top of the income distribution. Through their employer, a
quarter of these households have insurance that gives access
to both private and public health care. The rest either pay out
of pocket for private health care or use publicly financed
health care, which is subsidized but which for many services
(including in-patient services and medicines) involves sub-
stantial copayments.
The nonpoor informal sector (25% of the population) con-
sists of informal-sector workers and their families with
incomes above the poverty line. They typically lack health
insurance and pay for health care out of pocket.
The poor (65% of the population) consist of informal-sec-
tor workers living below the poverty line as well as the
unemployed and their families. It also includes people with
disabilities and elderly citizens with low incomes. Almost
none of them have health insurance; moreover, they can
afford only minimal out-of-pocket expenses for health care,
so their access to both private health care and the publicly
provided services for which there are copayments is severely
limited.
The government has committed to using a social health
insurance and/or community-based health insurance model.
Due to constrained financial resources and limited adminis-
trative and institutional capacity, the government cannot
expand coverage for all groups at once and must choose
between the following strategies:
1. First develop social health insurance for the formal
sector. This involves mandating enrollment of for-
mal-sector employees financed by a mix of employer
and employee contributions and government
subsidies.
2. First develop community-based health insurance that
targets the poor. This involves starting in areas that
have both a relatively high poverty rate and medical
facilities that are of a sufficient standard to make gain-
ing access to local health care worthwhile. Enrollment
is subsidized to keep premiums affordable, and the
poorest receive a fee waiver. To build capacity and
ensure community support, the scheme would start
with voluntary enrollment. (In the long run, for reasons
articulated in case 3, the plan is to transition to manda-
tory enrollment.) To ensure that not only the ill enroll,
only entire families can join.16
The decision requires careful assessment of these strat-
egies’ possible effects, over the medium term, on different
segments of the population. Such an assessment is complex
and its results will be sensitive to country context. Nonethe-
less, common country experiences permit the following gen-
eral analysis.
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Health Benefit Maximization
Starting with social health insurance for the formal sector may
have the following advantages in implementation. Formal-sec-
tor workers can be readily identified and enrolled. By contrast,
it can be difficult to effectively target the poor.15,17-19 It may
therefore be easier to develop the capacities needed for operat-
ing a prepaid health plan with the formal-sector population.
Moreover, the possibility of collecting premiums through pay-
roll taxes helps ensure that the plan has a sound actuarial
basis. In time, it may generate a surplus that could later be
used to extend coverage to the poor and those in the nonpoor
informal sector.15,17-19 For these reasons, a large majority of
now-developed countries that opted for a social health insur-
ance and/or community-based health insurance model began
their moves toward UHC with the formal sector.17
The formal-sector-first strategy also has some disadvan-
tages, however. Because the formal-sector population is bet-
ter off, they will typically care less than the poor about
coverage for low-cost and very cost-effective services
(because they could afford to pay for these themselves out of
pocket). They will also be willing to contribute more than
the poor to coverage for very costly and less cost-effective
services (such as dialysis). If one were to design a package
solely in response to the preferences of the better off, one
would find it ill-suited to the needs of the poor and unafford-
able to offer universally. If one pursues the formal sector–
first strategy in response to the better-off’s demands, it may
be more difficult to later expand the same scheme to the non-
poor informal sector and the poor, leading to fragmented
benefit packages and financing.
Now consider the strategy of starting with community-
based health insurance. As indicated, one challenge is that in
poorer, typically more rural areas, it may be more difficult to
find competent staff to set up and enforce contracts with pub-
lic and private health providers and to administer payments
than it is to find staff who can perform these activities for a
health plan involving formal-sector workers in cities. More-
over, it has often proven difficult to identify the very poorest
for fee waivers. The very poorest therefore sometimes do not
gain effective access to community-based health insurance.20
Nonetheless, some countries’ experiences indicate that these
problems can be addressed.16,21 For example, if there is
already a reasonably well-functioning safety net program for
poor households, then the government can leverage this pro-
gram to inform the poor about community-based health
insurance and to identify households in need of a fee
waiver.16 If the poor can be targeted effectively, the follow-
ing can be said in favor of the poor-first strategy. The poorest
tend to benefit most from insurance schemes, because they
face greater financial (and other) barriers and have greater
unmet health needs.22 A given reduction in costs of access
(and other barriers) is therefore likely to generate greater
total health benefits when directed toward the poor. More-
over, because the poor lack even the most essential services,
a benefit package designed for their needs can focus on a
basic minimum of interventions that have high priority on
grounds of cost-effectiveness, priority for the worse off, and
financial risk protection.15
Priority for the Worse Off
On average, the poor face greater disease burdens and have
worse access to health services. If their enrollment in commu-
nity-based insurance can be effectively subsidized, the poor-first
strategy therefore does more for the worse off. By contrast, the
formal-sector-first strategy prioritizes those who are, on aver-
age, better off along a variety of dimensions and leaves the
worse off behind. The formal-sector-first strategy can therefore
be said to be consistent with concern for the worse off only if
(1) there is a clear pathway for eventual expansion to the whole
population and (2) capacity constraints render the poor-first
strategy substantially less likely to succeed.
Financial Risk Protection
In our case, even among formal-sector workers, health insur-
ance coverage is low. Some unenrolled formal-sector work-
ers will therefore face catastrophic health expenditures. The
formal-sector-first strategy mitigates these through mandat-
ing and subsidizing enrollment. However, if successful, the
poor-first strategy will offer greater protection for worse-off
groups. For the poor, even small out-of-pocket expenses can
be catastrophic. The poor are also less able to absorb the lost
earnings caused by untreated illness. They therefore gener-
ally reap greater benefits from insurance schemes in terms of
lowering risks of destitution due to out-of-pocket expendi-
tures and ill health.22
Recommendation
If the capacity for targeting the poor and offering them ade-
quate services in return for their contributions exists or can be
developed, then starting with community-based health insur-
ance for the poor is likely to be superior to starting with insur-
ance for the formal sector on grounds of benefit maximization,
priority for the worse off, and financial risk protection. Under
these circumstances, it is therefore fairest to pursue the poor-
first strategy. Countries who choose this strategy can learn
from others who have pursued it with some success.15
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Starting with social health insurance for the formal sector is
just only if the alternative poor-first strategy is unlikely to suc-
ceed because of limitations in administrative capacity and in the
ability to effectively target the poor. Countries pursuing this
strategy should be mindful of the potential for exacerbating
health inequalities. They should focus on high-priority services
to avoid creating a package that, due to its expense, would delay
the enrollment of the poor and those in the nonpoor informal
sector.
Given the large and competing interests at stake, public
participation in decision making and public accountability
for the choice of strategy are required.
CASE 3. VOLUNTARY ORMANDATORY
INSURANCE FOR THE “MISSING MIDDLE”?
A lower-middle-income country is committed to pursuing
UHC via a social health insurance path. It currently operates
mandatory social health insurance for the formal sector,
which comprises 30% of the population. It has also embed-
ded in the social health insurance plan a program that pays
insurance contributions for the poor, who make up 40% of
the population. The poor have thereby achieved reasonably
high rates of coverage. The lowest rate of coverage is among
the nonpoor informal sector, which consists of the remaining
30% of the population. (This phenomenon is known as the
“missing middle.”15) The government is seeking to address
this coverage gap for the nonpoor informal sector.
The government is considering the following two
strategies:
1. Voluntary enrollment for the nonpoor informal sector.
This involves encouraging enrollment through informa-
tion campaigns and making contributions depend on
indicators for household income and wealth. The less
well-off receive subsidies.
2. Mandatory enrollment for the nonpoor informal sector.
This involves requiring all nonpoor to enroll, with enforced
contributions depending on indicators for household
income and wealth. The less well-off receive subsidies.
Both strategies are expected to make roughly equal
demands on the health budget. Though mandatory enroll-
ment will cover a larger population, as explained below, the
scheme would be designed to balance these greater expendi-
tures with greater contributions.
A first step is to estimate the benefits and costs of each
strategy. Such an estimate will be context specific. The fol-
lowing considerations draw on general country experiences.
Health Benefit Maximization
Though voluntary enrollment can be part of a transitional
phase in the development of health insurance (as discussed in
case 2), it has generally not proven successful at generating
truly universal coverage. It has resulted in low levels of enroll-
ment in a number of countries, even when coupled with partial
subsidies and information campaigns.15,18,19,23 One reason for
low enrollment is a common reluctance to pay up front for
services one may not need. Another is that voluntary enroll-
ment tends to generate an insurance pool in which individuals
with the highest health costs predominate.24 This problem
arises as follows. To avoid unfairly burdening those who have
higher health risks with higher premiums, premiums need to
be made independent of each individual’s risk profile. (This is
a process known as “community rating.”) Suppose one were
initially to set this premium at a rate that would cover the
average expenditure on health care in the population. For such
a risk-independent premium, insurance would be most attrac-
tive to people who expect to have an above average need for
health services. Those who would voluntarily enroll would
therefore generally have disproportionately high health risks.
To cover the costs of this high-risk pool in a voluntary
scheme, one would either have to raise the premium or
increase subsidies. If one were to raise the premium, at the
margin, those with the lowest risks would drop out of the
pool, because they would regard insurance as too expensive
relative to their personal risk profile. This would worsen the
risk profile of the enrolled population, meaning that premiums
would have to be raised again, making the problem circular.
If, instead, one were to increase subsidies, this would lead to
an increased fiscal burden. For a given budget, this would
therefore place a limit on total enrollment and on the associ-
ated population health benefits.
Mandatory enrollment avoids this problem by generating
a pool with, on average, lower health risks than voluntary
enrollment. Moreover, if contributions are set so that youn-
ger, healthy, higher-income individuals pay more than their
expected costs in a given year, this strategy allows one to
cover a larger population without requiring more by way of
government funding than voluntary enrollment does. Of
course, mandatory enrollment can work only if the govern-
ment has the capacity to enforce income-dependent prepay-
ments from the nonpoor informal sector. Developing this
capacity can be challenging.15,18,19 But if this capacity exists
or can be developed, mandatory coverage will achieve
greater population health gains, because expanded coverage
generally improves health, especially if the mandated pack-
age consists of services that, according to the outlined crite-
ria, should have high priority.22
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Priority for the Worse Off
Voluntary enrollment will, on average, improve the situation
of those who choose to enroll. As discussed, these will dis-
proportionately be those who are worse off in terms of health
prospects. However, this will leave uninsured those who
believe themselves currently to be at low health risk, those
who lack the relevant information to enroll, and those who,
amid the pressures of daily life and the difficulty of making
the insurance decision, simply do not enroll.
Among those who would not purchase insurance under vol-
untary enrollment, we must consider three groups of individu-
als. First, there would be those who do not later develop
substantial health problems. These would end up better off
under voluntary enrollment because they would not have to
pay the insurance premium. Second, there would be those
who develop substantial health problems for which interven-
tions are not covered in the mandatory package. These would
also not be better off with the mandatory package. Third, there
would be those who develop substantial health problems for
which relevant interventions are covered under the insurance
package. These would most likely be better off under manda-
tory enrollment, because they will not have to pay out of
pocket for needed services. The second and third groups are,
on average, worse off in terms of health outcomes, but manda-
tory insurance is better only for the third group. The question
regarding whether mandatory enrollment is, on balance, best
for the worse off in health therefore depends on the package
of covered services. If it is well designed to consist primarily
of services that should have high priority given the criteria of
maximum benefit, priority for the worse off, and financial risk
protection, then the third group is likely to be substantial in
number and also to be greatly benefited. A well-designed man-
datory package therefore represents the option that does more
for the worse off in terms of health outcomes.
Financial Risk Protection
Because it covers more of the nonpoor informal sector, an
effective mandate offers greater protection against the finan-
cial risks of ill health. It also enables forms of cross-subsidi-
zation that are consistent with solidarity: the better off
subsidize the less well-off, and the healthy subsidize the
unhealthy.
Other Considerations
In this case, one further key issue is the need to respect and
promote each individual’s autonomy, understood as the
power to exercise control over key parts of one’s life by mak-
ing free and informed decisions.
Voluntary enrollment preserves people’s freedom not to
purchase health insurance. Mandatory enrollment, by contrast,
eliminates this freedom and thereby infringes on the autonomy
of those who do not consent to this limitation. However, the
role of a mandate in securing a well-functioning insurance
scheme provides reasons for individuals to consent to this lim-
itation.25,26 The vast majority of individuals in the nonpoor
informal sector who are currently at low risk of health prob-
lems presumably want health insurance available at reasonable
cost when their risks become high (such as later in life or
when they develop a need for expensive care). Due to the
aforementioned problems of voluntary schemes, insurance
might not be available to them at an affordable cost if each
person were left free not to insure themselves. It may therefore
be in the long-term interests of the vast majority of young and
healthy individuals who are currently at low risk that everyone
is forced to insure themselves, because the mandate ensures
that there is affordable insurance when they later need it.
Thus, mandatory payments may be justified as an efficient
way of enabling each to get something they want but could
not get if each were free to make decisions independently.
Insofar as citizens see the role of the mandate in this way,
they will consent to it. The autonomy of those who do so con-
sent is not infringed by the mandate.
In addition, health services are crucial in promoting indi-
vidual autonomy. Only with a minimum of health can a per-
son be truly autonomous and enjoy a wide range of
opportunities. One reason for an effective mandatory system
is therefore its contribution to promoting autonomy by ensur-
ing access to needed health services.25
Recommendation
Country experiences strongly suggest that voluntary enroll-
ment is unlikely to achieve UHC.15 If the capacity exists or
can be developed to enforce income-dependent contributions
from the nonpoor informal sector, then mandatory enroll-
ment for this sector is the fairest strategy. It promises larger
aggregate health gains, better access to care for those with
health problems, and more extensive transfers from the
healthy and better off to the sick and less well-off. Though it
removes the freedom to remain uninsured, this may be justifi-
able insofar as it is necessary to ensure that everyone can
have affordable insurance when they are at high health risk.
Though it can be challenging to build mandatory systems,
governments can learn from the experience of a number of
low- and middle-income countries that have taken steps in
this direction.15
Given the substantial competing interests at stake in this
decision, public participation in decision making and public
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accountability for the choice of strategy are required. A pub-
lic explanation of the reasons for mandatory insurance can
also help to gain more people’s consent to the limitation on
liberty involved and thereby avoid infringing on the auton-
omy of those who do so consent.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed how choices on the road to UHC can be
guided by the principles of maximum total health gain, extra
weight for the interests of the disadvantaged, and protection of
people’s livelihoods against risks posed by ill health. We have
also discussed how, in particular contexts, further values are rele-
vant. It is not straightforward what each principle requires in a
given case. Moreover, though we have proposed some ways of
weighing the demands of these principles against each other and
against other relevant moral considerations, other approaches
may also be reasonable. In employing these principles to decide
particular cases, there is, therefore, no alternative to discernment
and careful, well-informed discussion.
We emphasize that such discussion must not only take place
by experts behind closed doors. Those whose interests are
affected, and in whose name trade-offs are made, should be able
to contribute to the discussion about the principles that should
guide these decisions and about how to balance these principles’
demands. To further such public participation, it may be useful
to involve members of the community alongside health care pro-
viders and producers in priority-setting fora, to voice the con-
cerns of those affected by a decision (as, for example,
representatives of patient groups can do in Thailand and Ger-
many or as public representatives do alongside representatives
of government and health professionals on Health Councils in
Brazil).27 It may also be valuable to invite members of the gen-
eral public, alongside health care providers, to consider and
approve general ideals and principles of justice for use in setting
priorities (as, for example, the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence’s Citizens’ Council does in England and
Wales). Finally, it is important that the reasoning behind key
decisions is publicized, so that it can be evaluated and contested.
Here, we hope to have facilitated such debate, by articulating
key principles and values and showing how they can be used to
arrive at judgments in difficult cases.
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NOTES
[a] Deliberation about justice also has other important
roles, including the evaluation of whether the con-
straints faced by the decision maker are themselves fair.
However, this is not our task in this article.
[b] Though estimates of the cost-effectiveness of interventions
are very valuable for policy making, we emphasize that
they must be treated with caution. In particular, external
validity may be an issue. In employing an estimate derived
from a study of an intervention in one environment, one
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must consider whether the results are likely to hold in the
context in which the intervention is being considered. This
extrapolation is especially challenging in lower- and mid-
dle-income countries.
[c] A similar case is discussed briefly elsewhere.28 Our dis-
cussion here is far more comprehensive. We also rely
on improved estimates of the cost-effectiveness of the
interventions and the individual burdens they would
alleviate and have estimated a new indicator of financial
risk protection.
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